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Introduction
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT
Chief Judge
United States Court of Appeals
For the Third Circuit
The review of Third Circuit decisions by the Villanova Law Review
has become an established annual tradition. Extremely valuable to law
students, the practicing bar, and the federal judiciary, this survey is a
vehicle by which issues and decisions in adjudicated cases may be sub-
jected to in-depth analysis and criticism. Academic writers who criticize
these opinions, however, have advantages denied the judiciary. They
have the luxury of time. For example, each active judge on our court
considers over 300 fully briefed appeals per year plus almost an equal
number of petitions for rehearing and, again, an equal number of mo-
tions and pro se cases. Academic writers also have the authority to
range far beyond the frozen record of the tribunal of the first instance
that is presented to the appellate court. Moreover, critics are not shack-
led by limitations imposed upon the court by appellate counsel present-
ing points for review. The "smell of the lamp" is always important in
the review of matters decided in the hurly-burly world of a busy appel-
late court such as ours. When the review extends over a sampling of a
court's output in a given year such an effort can be of help to both
judges and practitioners in getting a "feel" for a court.
Thus, it is a valuable exercise to expose opinions of the Third Cir-
cuit to intelligent and thoughtful analysis. As a student of the judicial
process, however, I offer two modest suggestions that may increase the
quality of professional criticism. If opinion writing is a fine art, writing a
criticism is an even finer one. First, it is essential that the analyst
pinpoint the exact legal dispute between the parties. Second, if the
critic casts stones at the opinion writer's reasoning, the stone thrower
should recognize the distinctions among the court's reasoning process,
the weight given to the arguments, and the court's exercise of value
judgment. To implement these suggestions, the critic must fully under-
stand the nature of the judicial decisionmaking process, as well as the
sophisticated structure of "legal reasoning."
I.
Our judicial system requires a continuing accommodation between
the need to preserve a consistent and coherent set of ordering legal
precepts and the quest for tolerable, if not satisfactory, results in indi-
(828)
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vidual disputes. Our constant objective is to reconcile the demands of
general and specialjustice. Occasionally, when this reconciliation is im-
possible, particular litigants must suffer for the sake of order and predic-
tion. But the goal we seek is to increase the incidence of compatibility
between the formal legal theories that dominate our judicial system, and
basic justice for the litigants. We seek constant harmony between the
two, and if at times there is a tension, and perfect accommodation is not
attainable, at least we regard the ideal as always to be coveted.
Thus, the beginning point of any judicial decision is to identify the
flashpoint of conflict between the litigants: In relation to the relevant
body of law, where do the litigants agree, and where do they begin to
disagree? Similarly, any professional analysis of a judicial opinion
should begin at the same point, so that from the very start a proper
focus on the controversy will exist.
Those critics who single out a particular case for analysis will serve
the profession better if they identify the precise point where the litigants
conflict. Are the parties disputing the choice of legal precepts (rules of
law, principles, doctrines) that should control the facts as found by the
factfinder-what Roscoe Pound described as "finding the law"? Or have
the litigants agreed on the precept, and quarrel only over its interpreta-
tion, i.e., a question of construction of a particular statute? Or have the
litigants agreed on a settled precept and an equally settled interpreta-
tion, and argue only whether it should apply to facts found by the
factfinder in the tribunal of the first instance?
Law review treatment seems well suited to cases of the first cate-
gory, where two or more relevant legal principles have clamored for at-
tention, and the court had to decide which should control. A case
recently before our court, for example, would provide fertile ground for
scrutiny. That case involved the clash of the traditional teaching that the
contents of corporate records are not privileged from production in
grand jury and Internal Revenue Service investigations with the notion
that a producer of the business records of a sole proprietorship may
claim his fifth amendment privilege because the act of production may
be testimonial in nature and incriminating. The question for the law
review writer is: How should the court resolve this clash when the
records of a corporation that is solely owned are subpoenaed?
When principles compete, the body resolving that competition must
consider the relative weight of the conflicting principles. This weighing
process lies at the heart of judicial decisionmaking. The process in-
volves a choice that then becomes the major premise of the court's rea-
soning, in which logic compels the outcome of the decision.
The sociological jurisprudents-Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo-did
several things for us. They argued that a rule of law may be developed
by considering the consequences that are involved, rather than by sim-
ply identifying the wider principles that the rule presupposes. The soci-
19851 829
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ological jurisprudents contended that consideration of the ultimate
consequence was valid and legitimate, because it is the conclusion of the
judicial process, the ultimate decision, that has the effect on society.
Therefore, the result of a decision should be considered in the initial
process of weighing the competing principles.
Where several principles command the identical conclusion, the ju-
dicial opinion is strengthened. When a court chooses a single principle
over those that command different results, the court must support that
initial decision by persuasive reasoning, based on recognized legal prin-
ciples or upon some justificatory principle of morality, justice, social pol-
icy or common sense. The decision must be genuinely principled, its
analysis and reasoning quite transcending the immediate result that it
achieves. Further, the decision must be reasonably calculated to find
acceptance with the social groups intimately affected by the claim, de-
mand, or desire that forms the basis of the litigation before the court.
Finally, the result should meet the test of the ends of law: Professor
Harry W. Jones's test that the decision should contribute to the estab-
lishment and preservation of a social environment in which the quality
of human life can be spirited, improving, and unimpaired. At the same
time, the result also must respect the other ends-in-view of law: the
public peace, just dispute settlement, reasonable security of expecta-
tions, and tolerable adjustment of conflicting social interests.
When the court opts that one principle is to yield to another in a
given case, therefore, a value judgment is being made. The decision is
grounded on just that, a value judgment, not a conclusion reached by a
structured logical process. More likely than not, at least in the federal
courts, that judgment constitutes the court's declaration of public pol-
icy, that very unruly horse, of which it has been said that once we get
astride it, we never know where it will carry us. As early as 1880,
Holmes taught in The Common Law that the business of judging is "the
unconscious result of instinctive preference and inarticulate convictions,
but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis."
Later, Dean Eugene Rostow referred to judicial decisions as "social
judgments as to what is fair and just in the conduct of society."
A key ingredient in Cardozo's masterpiece, The Nature of the Judicial
Process, was his legitimation of decisionmaking on the basis of social wel-
fare, "commonly spoken of as public policy, the good of the collective
body." And Judge Andrews, Cardozo's dissenting colleague in Palsgraf,
in discussing the term "proximate cause," is often quoted:
What we do mean by the word "proximate" is, that because of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a cer-
tain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.
I purposely emphasize this point to demonstrate that the choice of
830 [Vol. 30: p. 828
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the controlling precept, where precepts conflict, is not the product of a
reasoning process. The choice is, as I state, a value judgment reached
from, in Lord Diplock's phrase, the cumulative experience of the judici-
ary. A formal reasoning process is implicated in justifying that choice,
not necessarily in making it. Many critics of judicial opinions, students
and professors alike, fail to recognize this crucial distinction. Rather
than examining an opinion for real logical flaws, these commentators
base their criticism solely on disagreements with a court's value judg-
ment. This, of course, is a perfectly legitimate function, so long as the
analysis is not shrouded by accusations of shoddy logic.
II.
Also deserving of careful law review treatment is the second type of
conflict-interpretation of the precept. More often than not, this con-
flict arises in the myriad of cases involving statutory construction. It is
important to identify three separate problems of interpretation that are
not always recognized by the critic. The first problem is one of language
analysis in the strict sense, or, the presence of an unclear norm. This, I
believe, is the easy case. The case presents a problem of semantics and
the court says what it thinks the language means. To be most helpful,
the critic should identify which of several interpretative techniques the
court has used. Courts rely primarily on five techniques in interpreting
statutes: (a) The Mischief Rule, originating in Heydon's Case (1584):
what was the mischief that the statute attempted to alleviate?; (b) The
Golden Rule: to declare the expressed intention of the legislature;
(c) The (English) Literal Rule; (d) The (American) Plain Meaning Rule
(first cousin to the Literal Rule); and finally, (e) The Search of Legisla-
tive History to divine the implied intention of the legislature, not readily
discernible from statutory language (the darling of the present United
States Supreme Court).
The second problem of statutory construction is the problem of la-
cunae, or the nonexistent norm. This problem is not strictly a question
of language analysis, but of sailing on uncharted seas, or playing "let's
pretend we're in the legislature." Over sixty years ago, a prescient John
Chipman Gray identified what was to become one of the most serious
problems facing courts today, especially federal courts, in problems of
statutory construction. He spoke of the difficulties of interpretation
"that arise when the legislature has had no meaning at all [in mind];
when a question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when
what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the legislature did
mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it
would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had
been present." When this occurs, Learned Hand said, the judge "puts
into the legislature's mouth the things which he thinks it ought to have
said, and that is very close to substituting what he himself thinks right.
1985]
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Nobody does this exactly right; great judges do it better than the rest of
us. It is necessary that someone shall do it, if we are to realize the hope
that we can collectively rule ourselves."
I now address the third problem of statutory construction: the
problem of evolution, the problem of the norm whose meaning changes
although its text remains constant. Section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, is a classic example of
the norm changing, and the text remaining the same, as courts apply an
ongoing historical theory of interpretation. Likewise, I feel confident
that the drafters of the Sherman and Clayton Acts would not recognize
modern case law as reflective of their original legislative intent. The
critical problem always is to resolve the tension between the legislature's
original intent (legislative history) and an interpretation based on a sub-
sequent external history of gloss added by layers of precedent.
Thus, precept interpretation merits critical analysis. A conscien-
tious examination of the problems of statutory construction and the in-
terpretive method used by the court to arrive at its decision should
produce criticism that will steer the court away from making arbitrary
"value judgments in the guise of legislative interpretation."
III.
The third type of dispute found in the cases occurs when both the
law and its interpretation are settled, and the sole question remaining is
one of applying the law to the facts at bar. This situation characterizes
approximately eighty percent of the cases coming before our court.
Most of these cases do not deserve law review treatment, but some do.
The common law tradition is an incremental process. Generally,
judicial history is not made if a precept is gradually extended to a new
set of facts, or if the court decides to hold the line and not apply the
previous rule to new facts. It is a different matter, however, when the
court applies the method of analogy and makes a quantum leap forward,
applying the law to facts that bear little resemblance to those already in
the precedential line, or when the court refuses to apply a respected
precedent to facts closely resembling those of previous cases. In such
cases, the judges are using what Professor Karl Llewellyn called the
"strict" precedent approach: the previous case applied only to "red-
headed Walpoles driving magenta-colored Buicks."
Those influenced by "the smell of the lamp" in academic halls often
are more willing to extend the law, to continue the aromatic metaphor,
than those succumbing to "the smell of the conference room" in the
courthouses. Probably because of the collegial composition of the
multi-judge appellate structure, the courts, in the expression of Justice
William H. Rehnquist in Scott v. Illinois, are "less willing to extrapolate
an already extended line when, although the general nature of the prin-
ciple sought to be applied is clear, its precise limits and the ramifications
832 [Vol. 30: p. 828
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become less so." But we do know at least that the line of motion in any
precedent, in the formulation of Felix S. Cohen, is subjected to a special
pull that skews it whenever it passes near a point of high value tension.
I turn now to a discussion of the mechanics of legal reasoning itself.
IV.
Legal reasoning is subject to more scrutiny than any aspect of the
judicial process. Forming the very fiber of argument and persuasion,
logic is the heart of the written brief, the essence of the process ofjustifi-
cation. Legal reasoning constitutes the foundation of the case method
by which law students are trained. At times, criticism of the "reasoning"
of courts appears to form the raison d'tre for law reviews. Yet law re-
views generally contain little analysis of reasoning qua reasoning. Often,
an alleged attack on a court's "reasoning" is in reality a disagreement
with the value judgment implicit in the court's major premise; a disa-
greement with the court's selection or its interpretation of the legal pre-
cept. This type of disagreement is actually a quarrel with the validity of
a controlling legal norm, not with the court's reasoning process. Criti-
cism of court opinions would be more professional, briefs more clear,
points of friction between litigants earlier identified and accommodated
with more fairness and durability, when resort to the overarching cos-
mos of "reasoning" is minimized, and attention directed instead to pre-
cise components of that cosmos. It is not too much to ask whether a
party disagrees with the choice of the "authoritative starting point" (ma-
jor premise) and, if so, why; or whether the quarrel is with the formal
correctness of the syllogism used and, if so, where.
The essence of legal argument is that the structure of the presenta-
tion adhere to the rules of logic. The opinion's internal structure, the
syllogism used by the court, must not be vulnerable to attack, either by
concurring or dissenting opinions, or by piercing criticism in the law
reviews. Moreover, the argument also must be free from material falla-
cies, i.e., where the error lies in the factual content of the argument,
rather than its structure.
In this context of critiquing opinions, I issue a gold-plated caveat:
do not use the expression, "the reasoning is flawed." These trite
buzzwords seem to breed in damp places of dark law school classrooms.
Do not use them unless you are prepared to go forward and identify the
flaw in proper terms; unless you intend to prove that there is something
sloppy in forming the logical premises and that this makes the logical
structure invalid. Do not use the expression when the argument simply
is not convincing.
A.
I first address the opinion's internal logical structure. A court
19851 833
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should pattern its opinion's structure after the typical "Socrates-is-a-
mortal" syllogism:
An oral conveyance of real estate is invalid.
This is an oral conveyance of real estate.
Therefore, this conveyance is invalid.
To adhere to this syllogism is to present a formally valid argument.
Such an argument, I emphasize, does not depend upon the truth of the
premises (although I think that there is truth in the example I have
given). Use of the syllogism means only that the conclusion logically
follows from the premises. Professor Edward H. Levi had this in mind
in his dandy article, Introduction to Legal Reasoning:
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by exam-
ple. It is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process
described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition
descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and then
applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these: simi-
larity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the
first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable
to the second case. This is a method of reasoning necessary for
the law, but it has characteristics which under other circum-
stances might be considered imperfections.
But we must pause to parse the syllogism, the basic structure of
legal reasoning. The categorical major premise, in most instances, is a
legal precedent that relates the middle term (facts contained in the pre-
cedent) and the major term (a declared legal consequence). The minor
premise relates the minor term (the facts found by the factfinder in the
case at bar) to the middle term. The conclusion then relates the minor
term to the major term. It bears emphasis that the correct interrelation
of the minor, major and middle terms speaks only to logical form, struc-
ture, or validity. The relationship does not necessarily address truth-
preserving qualities and vice versa. For example, examine the following
structure that, although seemingly valid, does not correctly follow requi-
site formal requirements:
All crimes are punishable.
Murder (larceny) is punishable.
Therefore, murder (larceny) is a crime.
This may be true in fact, but the syllogism is false in form. Because
neither the major term (punishable) nor the minor term (mur-
der/larceny) is compared with all of the middle term (all crimes), the
middle term is undistributed and the fallacy of the undistributed middle
exists.
Nor is the following example valid. It utilizes an illicit process -
834 [Vol. 30: p. 828
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the major premise does not express a universal and the minor term does
not relate to the middle term:
Murder is a crime.
Larceny is not murder.
Therefore, larceny is not a crime.
But a revision can be made, patterned on a formally valid syllogism:
All crimes are punishable.
Murder (larceny) is a crime.
Therefore, murder (larceny) is punishable.
I emphasize, if not bolster, this point in an exhortation that if a critic
believes that the reasoning is "flawed" in a judicial opinion, he should
demonstrate where the flaw occurs in the structure. Keep in mind that
in a deductive argument, the premises purport to be sufficient to estab-
lish the conclusion as true. A good deductive argument is one that is
formally valid, with all of its premises being true.
B.
Keep also in mind the distinction between (1) the logical form of
the argument and (2) the content of the argument (premises). If your
criticism of the opinion is with its content, say so, and explain. Do not
muddle the criticism by taking a poke at the opinion's logical form.
To be sure, the flaw can appear in the facts contained in the struc-
ture, rather than the structure itself. This problem is referred to as a
"material" fallacy. Do not be content with saying that something is "fal-
lacious." Locate the fallacy, and identify it specifically. Frequently oc-
curring fallacies include: the fallacy of irrelevance or irrelevant
conclusion; the appeal to prestige; the ad hominem appeal to personal
ridicule; appeal to the masses; the appeal to terror; the fallacy of acci-
dent; the converse fallacy of accident (hasty generalization); false cause
(post hoc); and non sequitur.
But the fallacy of begging the question is one of the most frequent
of all fallacies. Often, this fallacy slips by unnoticed. For example, one
of the very serious questions I had in our court's 1982 Abscam case was
how we could find federal jurisdiction without the Government's estab-
lishing an obstruction of interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act. In
that case, an FBI agent posed as an agent of an Arab sheik who, he said,
was interested in building a hotel in Philadelphia. This story, of course,
was fanciful. I agreed with the district court's holding that the Hobbs
Act did not operate to confer federal jurisdiction "over purely hypothet-
ical potential impacts in commerce which could never occur." The gov-
ernment's answer to this jurisdictional problem, accepted by the
majority, was that factual impossibility to complete a conspiracy is no
defense. Such an argument begs the question. The argument is a clas-
1985] 835
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sic example of the fallacy of petitio principii - assuming the conclusion,
i.e., that federal jurisdiction did in fact exist. In response I said, "They
confuse proof of the crime of conspiracy with the jurisdictional power to
punish the crime."
C.
I strongly emphasize the necessity of identifying the "flaw" in the
reasoning because often the quarrel with an opinion is not with its logi-
cal interpretation but with the process that enters into the construction
of the major and minor premises.
The major premise of the opinion is the critter at which you often
can aim your pot shots. As I said before, more often than not, a value
judgment has gone into its selection. If you disagree with the selection,
it is fair game to question the court's exercise ofjudgment and state why
you disagree.
Here, too, a dichotomy exists, because your criticism may be either
substantive or structural. For example, you may disagree with the sub-
stantive premise. A hotly debated issue in our court today is whether
the sixth amendment precludes admission of hearsay statements of a
coconspirator, unless the government first proves the unavailability of
the coconspirator and the reliability of his statements. You either agree
or disagree with this proposition, and chances are that either position
will be legitimate and sound.
Some major premises, however, are such well established prece-
dents that they cannot be the victims of assault, e.g., the defendant's
right to an attorney when charged with a felony. Still other premises
may be attacked, not for their substance, but because of the procedure
by which they were created. This problem arises when the relevant
precedents are neither hefty nor hearty, and the court has to construct
the major premise leading to its conclusion by use of the common law
tradition. As every first-year law student knows, the common law tradi-
tion is a combination of both inductive and deductive reasoning. When
courts use inductive reasoning to fashion the major premise, they can-
not state with absolute assurance that the resultant premise is the em-
bodiment of truth. All a court can say is that the premise it fashions is
more likely to be true than false, that the premise is probably right. Rec-
ognition of this limitation is important because courts utilize inductive
reasoning to construct a major premise, and then deduce a conclusion
(and a decision for the case) from the constructed premise. Courts use
two major tools in this construction business: generalization and anal-
ogy. As courts proceed to build the argument, they can become vulner-
able, and a keen analyst can easily detect the weak spots in the
construction.
In the common law tradition, each case produces a narrow legal
conclusion based on a detailed set of facts - what Pound called a rule of
836 [Vol. 30: p. 828
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law in the narrow sense. When a court has a number of narrow holdings
in a certain field of the law, it begins to enumerate the cases and distill
from them a more generalized precept, usually called a legal principle.
This structured principle is valid because the court relied on a sufficient
number of instances in an inductive reasoning process to reach it:
A is a criminal and A is vicious.
B is a criminal and B is vicious.
C is a criminal and C is vicious.
H is a criminal and H is vicious.
Therefore, all criminals are vicious.
The degree of vulnerability of the principle is related directly to the
number of specific instances used to justify a generalized conclusion,
that, in the ebb and flow of inductive-deductive reasoning, then serves
as a major premise from which to deduce another conclusion, the deci-
sion in the case. My example can be criticized because it failed to distin-
guish between felons who resort to violence and sedate white collar
felons who simply plan swindles or income tax dodges. If the principle's
construction is insufficient, the court rightfully is open to an accusation
that its reasoning is indeed "flawed" because it has relied on a fallacy,
either the converse fallacy of accident, the fallacy of insufficient or se-
lected instances, or hasty generalization.
The best candidates for this "logical" attack are opinions in which
the writer resorts to legislative history (take a look at Supreme Court
cases, as well as the Third Circuit's):
Senator Arlen Specter said the bill was designed to aid
single, working mothers.
Senator John Heinz said the bill was designed to aid single,
working mothers.
Therefore, we can conclude that it was the intention of the Congress
that the bill was designed to aid single, working mothers.
This conclusion may or may not be true. The senators could have been
speaking for the benefit of particular Pennsylvania constituents only,
and not reflecting the views of the drafting committee, the conference
committees, or a consensus of Congress.
Closely akin to reasoning by generalization is reasoning by analogy,
which is the basis of the Socratic method of teaching law. Pursuant to
this method, the courts do not fashion the major premise from an
enumeration of instances, but proceed from certain given or assumed
resemblances to an inferred resemblance. In this respect, too, courts
often are vulnerable to attacks on their reasoning. A court must identify
the number of respects in which the compared objects resemble one an-
other (let us call these similarities positive analogies) and the number of
respects in which they differ (negative analogies). Unlike the method of
19851
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generalization, with the method of analogy numbers do not count. In-
stead, what is important is relevancy; whether the compared objects re-
semble, or differ from, one another in relevant respects. For example,
assume:
Able Chevrolet Company, located in Philadelphia, is liable for
violating the antitrust laws for requiring a tie-in purchase of a
refrigerator manufactured by Mrs. Able if you want to buy a
Camaro.
It is not difficult to analogize that liability also would follow from these
facts:
Baker Pontiac Company required a tie-in purchase of a refrig-
erator manufactured by Mrs. Baker if you want to buy a
Firebird.
What about other circumstances? There are many resemblances in the
following fact situation, but are the resemblances relevant?
Villanova had a championship basketball team in 1984-85.
Team members came from high schools A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Villanova has now recruited new players from high schools A,
B, C, D, E, and F.
Therefore, Villanova will have a championship basketball team
in 1985-86.
An appreciation of these methods of reasoning will not only
sharpen your analysis, but will produce criticism that will illuminate
when a court has gone too far, or not far enough.
V.
In sum, those who take the time to prepare criticisms of judicial
opinions make a valuable contribution to the law. The exercise is valua-
ble because courts are the only agencies in our society where what we
say is as important as what we do. A reported opinion is a "performative
utterance," because what is uttered today performs tomorrow in plan-
ning and directing the personal and business affairs of private persons
and public officials.
Be as careful in your criticism of these utterances as you would have
the authors be. A professional critic, student or practitioner, is a
pathologist of the law, performing post-mortems. Always be certain that
you examine the entire anatomy of the opinion, that you know the
proper nomenclature for all its relevant parts, and that your examination
is thorough enough and accurate enough to identify and justify your ob-
servations. If you do this, you will be preserving the tradition of the
American law review at its finest.
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